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1. Abstract 
Based on an analysis of demand and supply in the current oil market and 
taking into account which factors, in both the short and long term, will 
drive future pricing of crude oil, we conclude that in the long term some 
fundamental and structural changes will occur. Chief amongst these are: a 
major concentration of oil production in a limited number of countries, a 
structurally low spare capacity as a percentage of total supply, an increase in 
production costs and possibly a continuous increase in demand driven by 
economic growth in developing countries. We conclude by discussing 
possible evolutions in the oil market based on three future scenarios and 
discuss the economic consequences of those scenarios. 
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2. Introduction 
On 2nd January 2008, the nominal price of a barrel of crude oil3 on the New 
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) reached an historic record during 
trading of $1004. Less than eight years before, in the week of 12th February 
1999, the price per barrel on the same NYMEX stood at an historic low of 
just $9.31 per barrel5. Based on one year forward pricing6 of $75 to $85 for a 
barrel of crude oil, we may estimate that current prices are affected by a $15 
to $25 price speculation. This means nevertheless that oil prices, even 
without speculation, remain at a high level. 
 
In the short term (0-3 years), price per barrel is determined by the 
anticipated evolution of demand and supply. This anticipated evolution is 
highly sensitive to structural limitation, particularly bottlenecks in the 
structural components of the logistical supply chain and expectations 
regarding the evolution of spare capacity.  
 
However, in the longer term (10-30 years), more fundamental and structural 
changes will take place: on the one hand, a shift in the quality of oil being 
mined, on the other hand an increasing concentration of oil production in a 
limited number of countries. The Gulf States and Russia will play an 
increasingly major role in this regard. One thing is already clear: oil will 
become more expensive - and probably remain expensive - in the longer 
term.  
 
High oil prices result in significant negative social consequences. This is 
especially the case for petroleum importing poor countries since it leads to a 
decrease in the countries overall welfare per capita (e.g. reduction in buying 
power due to imported inflation) affecting large parts of the population. In 
general and on a worldwide scale, high oil prices nearly always (i.e. if no 
social measures are taken) have an effect on the poorest people who depend 
on gasoline or petrol for transportation to their work and sometimes for 
                                                   
3 This is actually the price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) Light Sweet (LS) crude oil as 
quoted on NYMEX and based on the price settlement hub at Cushing, Oklahoma. WTI is a type of crude 
oil used as a benchmark in oil pricing and the underlying commodity of NYMEX's oil futures contracts. 
4 See BBC market data on commodities at: 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/fds/hi/business/market_data/commodities/28698/default.stm [last 
accessed 7th January 2008]. 
5 See e.g. Energy Information Administration (EIA) at: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtcd.htm or 
Bloomberg at: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/commodities/energyprices.html [last accessed 3rd 
January 2008]. 
6 The NYMEX one-year forward price, for delivery in December 2008, for a barrel of WTI LS crude oil 
was $83.40 per barrel on 15th November 2007. 
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heating. But perhaps a high oil price is not such a bad thing as has been 
initially assumed. The third oil shock of 2006-2007, characterised by major 
price volatility on the markets, is forcing us to devise - at speed - scenarios 
in which oil no longer plays a prominent role. Moreover, this process is 
being accelerated by a growing awareness of the relationship between fossil 
fuels, CO2 emissions, reduced solar energy reflection, global warming and 
climate change [1].  
 
In this article we attempt, based on a systematic analysis of the current 
market situation (supply, reserve and demand), to gauge the possible long-
term evolution of the petroleum market7. We show that oil price 
calculations using econometric forecasting techniques or market data offer 
unreliable predictions. We therefore put forward our own vision of possible 
petroleum market and oil pricing evolutions based on strategic scenario planning 
techniques. This method allows us to consider and prepare for a variety of 
different possible future petroleum markets, which are not merely future 
extrapolations of past trends. 
 
The article comprises three parts. In the first part, we analyse and discuss 
the current petroleum market: the first section outlines the current issues 
facing the market, the second takes a closer look at the factors that 
determine supply, the third analyses oil reserves and the fourth and final 
paragraph deals with an analysis of market demand. In the second part we 
discuss future evolutions of the petroleum market based on three different 
future scenarios and discuss the economic effects that each of these 
scenarios could have. In the final part, we present our conclusions and 
concerns. 
 
3. Current situation: the only certainty is uncertainty 
In 2006, the world consumed almost as much oil as it extracted: around 
84.70 million barrels per day. In 2002, consumption stood at 76.96 million 
barrels per day1. However, the demand for energy, which rose by 1.4% a 
year between 1990 and 2002 [2][3], rose less quickly than worldwide 
economic growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is estimated at 
                                                   
7 Strictly speaking, we ought to talk about petroleum markets, since the price on the world market is 
determined for each oil field. The most important of these are Brent (North Sea) and West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) (US). In general, the WTI price is higher than the Brent price. We cannot therefore 
talk about a single oil price. 
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3.4% a year over the same period [4]. This shows that the planet’s energy 
intensity8, particularly with respect to oil, is steadily declining, dropping from 
560 litres petroleum equivalent per $1000 of GDP in 1971 to 380 litres in 
2002. By 2020, the world average could have dropped beneath the 300-litre 
level [5]. However, there are significant differences in energy intensity 
between OECD countries and the emerging economies. For example, in 
2005 China consumed 1150 litres per $1000 GDP compared with 180 litres 
for Europe. This reflects the high-energy intensity of emerging economies, 
which are consuming large amounts of energy in order to develop their 
incipient prosperity. Developing prosperity almost always involves strong 
growth in industrial activities, which is much more energy intensive than an 
agricultural or service economy. 
 
Emerging economies, which require and consume the most oil in order to 
drive their growth, are seeing the biggest rise in consumption: between 2002 
and 2006, oil consumption in China expanded from 5 to 7 million barrels 
per day and in the rest of Asia from 8 to 9 million barrels per day. Although 
the share of oil in China’s growth will unquestionably decline sharply, on 
the strength of that growth China is now poised to become the world’s 
second largest oil consumer after the United States. Global oil production - 
which in 2002 generated spare capacity of around 2 million barrels per day - 
is struggling to meet current demand. During 2006, global production (84.6 
million barrels per day) was 0.1 million barrels a day too little to satisfy 
demand. In situations where spare capacity is less than one percent, the 
market will inevitably react ultra-sensitively to the slightest geopolitical 
tension or glitch in supply by a major - or even a minor - producer, or to the 
expectation that this might occur (figure 1). OPEC, which was solely 
responsible for determining world oil prices until 1985, is still (only) 
producing 33 million barrels per day (all types of oil combined), and is 
therefore operating close to its production capacity limit9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
8 Energy intensity (also known as energy ratio) is a measure of an economy’s energy efficiency and thus 
its energy dependence. It is calculated as the number of units of energy consumed (e.g. expressed in litres 
of oil, mega joules, kg or tonne oil equivalent) per unit of Gross Domestic Product (e.g. expressed in US 
dollars ($) or euro (€)) at constant prices. 
9 Oil & Gas Journal, 2006, Worldwide look at reserves and production, 104, 22-23.  
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Figure 1:   Limited Production Surpluses, Strong Demand and Geopolitical 
 Uncertainties Lead to Big Price Rises 
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4. Analysis of supply: oil is located in high-risk countries 
Although there are many reasons why countries may be economically 
unstable, we can observe that in countries where oil production accounts 
for a large part of GDP this dependence on raw materials tends to increase 
in the longer term, which has a destabilising effect on the country’s prosperity. 
Over time, this destabilisation is felt politically and socially as well as 
economically. We observe that the (geo) political behaviour of countries like 
Iran, Russia and Venezuela is very different when oil prices are high 
compared with when they are low. Further, the substantial capital flows and 
profits associated with oil production (e.g. $340 billion in 2004 for OPEC 
countries) affect economic channels and the leading political classes. This 
can create a climate that is highly conducive to corruption10. In addition, oil-
producing countries are often so focused on this one activity that they tend 
                                                   
10 Insufficient separation between public funds and oil revenues is one of the principal causes of non-
transparency and thus of potential corruption. 
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to pay insufficient attention to developing new economic activities and 
infrastructure. 
 
A combination of the above-mentioned factors means that oil-producing 
countries often carry a high country risk. The prime example within OPEC 
is the entire Gulf region, where the legitimacy of ruling regimes is bitterly 
contested by radical Islamic fundamentalists. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait produced a combined total of almost 18 
million barrels per day11 in 2006. This however takes place under Western 
protection and with doubts as to the future of the, sometimes fragile Public-
Private Partnership (PPP)-controlled monopolistic, National Oil Companies 
(NOC) responsible for the oil production. In Iraq (2.5 million barrels per 
day, but with a potential capacity of almost double that amount), the 
situation is even more complicated and production and transmission 
facilities will probably face the threat of terrorist attacks for years to come. 
Iran (4 million barrels per day) raises other doubts and uncertainties: on 8 
August 2005, the day the resumption of the Iranian nuclear programme was 
announced, the petroleum price in New York broke the $64/barrel barrier 
for the first time. Aside from the Gulf region, the political and economic 
fragility of countries like Algeria (1.4 million barrels per day), Libya (1.7 
million barrels per day), Venezuela (2 to 3 million barrels per day, depending 
on the quality of the crude oil) and Nigeria (2.4 million barrels per day) 
should not be overlooked [5][6]. 
 
The same analysis applies to oil-producing companies outside OPEC. For 
example, in the time span of a few years, Russia (9.7 million barrels per day) 
has developed into an extremely important oil and gas producer and was 
accused by the IMF in 2006 of having an “addiction to easy money”. 
Indeed, for President Putin’s government there is a great temptation to buy 
social peace, which he did in 2005 by increasing public spending by 
$13.5 billion. Although this was not a problem for Russia in 2005 - the 
country having made over $100 billion in oil sales revenue in 2004 - the high 
oil and gas prices are now transforming Russia into a mono-economy12 
based on oil and gas production, with a significant relationship between 
growth of oil and gas production and growth of GDP13. According to the 
World Bank, Russia’s oil revenues accounted for 25% of its GDP in 2004. 
The Russian government is also increasingly scaling up, or wresting back, 
                                                   
11 All production figures that follow are for 2006. 
12 As a result, Gazprom (based on its 2006 turnover figures) is now the third largest company in the world 
after ExxonMobil and General Electric. 
13 World Bank, 2006, Russian economic report, 13 (December). 
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state control over the biggest oil companies (e.g. Transneft, Yukos) and oil 
and gas reserves for which concessions had been granted (e.g. Sakhalin II, 
Kovykta). By so doing, Russia - like other oil economies - risks becoming 
overdependent on oil revenues, with the associated risk of slowing down 
necessary economic reforms (on infrastructure and tax, for instance) by not 
using resources for structural economic development but instead funding 
short-term boosts to social well-being (e.g. public employment) with revenue 
generated from unsustainable raw materials.  
 
In the global context outlined above, the reluctance of large petroleum 
companies to step up their investment and exploration activities is 
understandable. They are being denied access to whole regions, either by the 
government (in the form of less efficient National Oil Companies or 
national monopolies) or by an excessively high country risk. This brings us 
to the problem of production capacity. 
 
On the supply side, the petroleum sector is characterised by a multitude of 
risks and a shortage of production and spare capacity. The excessively low 
oil prices at the end of the 20th century (average of $10 per barrel per day in 
1999) led to a shortage of investment capital. This, combined with a degree 
of inertia on the part of oil companies, has led to insufficient growth in 
production capacity in recent years. As a result, production, and refinery 
capacity in particular, is now operating very close to maximum capacity and 
thus in the inelastic part of the supply curve (see further figure 3). In these 
tense circumstances, it is no surprise that market prices are volatile and that 
markets are reacting strongly to slight changes in supply or the expectation of 
such changes due to climatic (e.g. hurricanes Katrina and Rita) and more 
particularly (geo) political, economical and social upheavals14 (e.g. 
assassination of Mrs Benazeer Buthu in Pakistan, the reduction of the 
Nigerian oil supply and a low dollar exchange rate have pushed the price per 
barrel crude oil on NYMEX above $100 in January 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
14 For an overview of political, economic and terrorist risks, see e.g. Oxford Analytical 
(http://www.oxan.com) or AON which publishes regular risk maps. Available at: 
http://www.aon.com/risk_management/terrorism_mitigation/terrorism_risk_map.jsp [last accessed 12th 
May 2007]. 
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5. Analysis of reserves: will the 21st century be the last petroleum 
century? 
According to data by Nakićenović, Grübler and McDonald [7], the total 
proven reserve15 of conventional and non-conventional fossil fuels (i.e. oil16, 
natural gas, coal) is 1282 Gtoe or 53844 EJ17. Of this, only 11.7% is 
conventional oil and 11.0% is conventional natural gas. On the basis of 
these figures, our fossil fuel supplies at the current rate of consumption will 
last for around 100 years in the case of oil, 160 years for natural gas and 274 
years for coal. We can see that the energy supply from conventional oil will 
only last between 36 and 59 years at the current rate of consumption or 
based on the reserve-to-production (R/P) ratio [8]. If in addition to these 
reserves we also take into account resources18 (e.g. subeconomic coal, breeder 
reactor uranium and thorium) and additional occurrences (e.g. natural gas 
hydrates and uranium), the Earth probably has enough potential non-
renewable energy reserves to meet its energy needs until the end of the 22nd 
century, assuming energy consumption remains constant. This is not taking 
into account market price, technological developments, renewable energy or 
social acceptability. More recent figures from the Statistical Review of World 
Energy [9] indicate that at the end of 2005 the world had a reserve of 1201 
billion barrels of (conventional and non-conventional) oil. This figure is 
regularly revised based on developments in exploitation techniques19 and on 
market prices. For example, it rose by 10.6% between 1997 and 2004. 
Exxon Mobil goes further, estimating current reserves at 2200 billion barrels 
[10]. Depending on which study you follow, this equates to an R/P ratio of 
40 to 70 years at the 2006 production rate of 84.6 million barrels per day. In 
reality, this reserve will probably not last 40 to 70 years, as production is 
expected to continue rising before peaking at around 120 million barrels per 
day sometime between 2020 and 2030 [11]. However, these estimates are 
highly controversial. Optimists point out that during the first oil crisis in 
1973 the world had a reserve of less than 41 years. The sharp price rises 
prompted the discovery of many new oil reserves in the 1970s and 1980s. 
                                                   
15 We consider the terms ‘reserve’, ‘economic reserve’, ‘proven reserve’ and ‘identified reserve’ to be 
synonyms meaning: the amount of energy that has been discovered and is expected to be economically 
exploitable. For definitions see: World Petroleum Council (WPC), the Society of Petroleum Engineers 
(SPE) or the WEA. 
16 Conventional oil comprises oil and liquid petroleum gas (NGL: Natural Gas Liquids); non-conventional 
oil comprises heavy oils, tar sand oil/bituminous oil, shale oil and coal oil (GTL: Gas-to-Liquids). 
17 Gtoe = Giga (109 or billion) tonne oil equivalent - EJ = Exa Joule = 1018 Joule. 
18 Resources are energy reserves that have been discovered but are not yet economically (i.e. 
subeconomically) exploitable, and those (economic and subeconomic) that have not yet been discovered. 
19 Current exploitation techniques offer an average extraction efficiency of 35%. It is anticipated that this 
could be raised to 65-70%, implying a 15% reduction in the estimate of reserves and resources. 
European Review of Energy Markets- volume 2, issue 3, May 2008 
Vision of evolutions in the petroleum market 
Derrick P. Gosselin & Jan Leysen 
 
 
10 [2008] 6 EREM © European Energy Institute and contributors 
Aside from the discoveries themselves, which are progressing more 
systematically then ever before but at a much slower rate, another factor to 
be taken into account is the technological progress that has enabled more 
effective exploitation due to greater extraction efficiency [12][13]. 
 
Nevertheless, there is no escaping the fact that oil is a finite energy resource. 
Although it is difficult to estimate today how much of an impact a price of 
$80-$100 per barrel will have on investment in exploration and exploitation 
techniques, and although current world oil reserves probably exceed 2000 
billion barrels, the fact remains that the earth’s crust does not contain an 
inexhaustible supply of oil. It is probably realistic to assume that by the end 
of the 21st century humans will be using oil less and less as a primary energy 
source. According to some experts [14][15][16][17], estimates of reserves 
and resources are too high and production will probably begin to tail off 
half a century earlier, around 2050 (cf. Hubbert peak20), if we fail to curb our 
mounting oil consumption by more rational and efficient use of energy or 
by developing alternative primary energy sources. The critical role of 
technological innovation thus becomes immediately apparent. Other experts 
[18][19], big petroleum companies [20][21] and recent research by the US 
Geological Survey [22] amongst others suggest that the vision proposed by 
Campbell [14], Bentley [15] and Simmons [17] is overly pessimistic and that 
there will be no physical shortage of non-renewable energy before the end 
of the 22nd century, although temporary shortages may occur.  
 
If we fail, or are too slow, to develop alternatives, in addition to the 
potential implications of the Hubbert peak another transitional problem will 
arise, namely the geographical concentration of conventional oil reserves. At 
the end of 2005, OPEC estimated that it controlled a reserve of 913 billion 
barrels. This equates to 76.02% of global oil stocks, based on the estimated 
world oil reserve of 1201 billion barrels [22]. Moreover, 65.0% of world 
reserves are located in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, for example, has a 
reserve of 264 billion barrels). Conventional production regions21 such as 
                                                   
20 In 1956, Dr Marion King Hubbert was the first person to correctly predict the evolution of US oil 
production using a mathematical model based on a Gauss curve. He concluded from this that the 
production of an oil field (but also of a region, a country or the world) would evolve along a Gauss curve. 
The top of the Gauss curve corresponds to the moment of maximum oil production. This is known as the 
Hubbert peak. Global attainment of the Hubbert peak is seen as the end of the oil age and is theoretically 
expected to occur before 2015. However, based on recent empirical research, a production plateau - rather 
than a production peak - is now anticipated, which could push back the production peak by some 20 to 30 
years. 
21 We do not take into account non-conventional oil reserves such as extra heavy bituminous oils from the 
Orinoco (Venezuela) or tar sand oil from Alberta (Canada). 
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Europe, Africa and Latin America will probably have used up their reserves 
by 2025-2035 (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2:   Shift in World Production Capacity (million barrels per day) 
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This is only 20 to 30 years away! Leaving aside Russia, the world will 
therefore be almost completely dependent for its supply of conventional 
(and generally cheap-to-extract) oil on the Arabian/Persian Gulf (table 1) - a 
geopolitically unstable region at the heart of the biggest socio-religious issue 
of the start of the 21st century: the place of Islam in our societies. 
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Table 1:   Increase in concentration of production capacity (million barrels per day) 
 
 
Rank Country 1995 2005 2015 
1 Saudi Arabia 10.8 12.6 13.0 
2 Russia 6.2 9.6 11.5 
3 Iran 3.8 4.3 5.7 
4 Iraq 2.1 2.6 5.5 
5 Canada 2.4 3.5 5.3 
6 Venezuela 3.0 3.0 4.5 
7 UAE 2.7 3.1 3.9 
8 Kuwait 1.8 2.9 3.7 
9 Nigeria 2.1 2.9 3.6 
10 Kazakhstan 0.4 1.2 3.1 
11 Algeria 1.4 2.3 2.9 
12 Libya 1.4 2.0 2.8 
13 Brazil 0.8 1.8 2.6 
14 Angola 0.6 1.2 2.3 
15 Azerbaijan 0.2 0.5 1.0 
 Total Top 15 (106 
barrels/day) 
39.5 53.5 71.5 
 % global production 
capacity  
55 % 61 % 69 % 
 
Source: World Energy Council 2004, IEA - World Energy Outlook 2007 
 
However, within the next five to 10 years, the decisive factor influencing 
supply will not be increased concentration or limited reserves but rather the 
capacity-limiting element in the supply chain. Since 2005, this element has 
been refining capacity. Two causes underlie this fact. Firstly, more and more 
newly tapped oil fields are yielding hard crude oil. This probably indicates 
that stocks of cheap, high-quality oil have been virtually exhausted. This 
trend will be reinforced by the eventual exploitation of non-conventional oil 
fields such as those containing tar sand and oil sand, heavy bituminous oils 
and oil shales22 [23][24], since all of these additional fields also yield heavy 
oil. This evolution will lead to a reduction in the average quality of crude oil 
due to an increase in the ratio between heavy and light crudes. As a result, 
                                                   
22 According to the IEA, oil shale represented 1.4% of global production or 1 million barrels per day in 
2004. The IEA expects this to increase to 3.0% by 2010. 
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refinery infrastructure will become less productive23. Secondly, refining 
capacity has remained almost constant in recent years due to low oil market 
prices in the 1990s. Both of these factors have, in effect, caused a drop in 
existing refining capacity (figure 3), which if demand remains constant will 
lead to price rises unless more is invested in capacity (i.e. the inelastic region 
of the supply curve). Note also that the lower quality of heavy oil will 
translate into increased CO2 emissions, a lower energy value, higher 
exploitation costs and a greater energy requirement to convert heavy crude 
oil into useable energy.  
 
Figure 3:  Heavier Oil has the Effect of Reducing Refining Capacity 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
23 More hydrocarbon compounds are needed to refine heavy oil compared with light oil (different 
stoechiometric ratio), meaning a 26% theoretical drop in the productivity of refining capacity. This 
explains why heavy crude is traded at 70-60% the price of light crude. 
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6. Analysis of market demand: can we limit demand? 
The history of petroleum is fascinating. In a relatively short period - 150 
years at most - this fuel has become indispensable due to modern 
production and consumption habits. Petroleum has emerged as one of the 
cornerstones of our economic prosperity over the past 30 years [25]. We 
know that our oil reserves are limited and yet with every new oil crisis - and 
the one in 2005-2006 where oil price went from $30 to $65 per barrel to 
reach eventually more than $100 et the beginning of 2008 can safely be 
termed an oil shock - the world reels in disbelief at the scale of a problem 
which for decades it has tried to ignore. The warning light was flashing as 
early as 1974. All, mainly rich and oil-dependent OECD countries, 
attempted to reduce their dependence on OPEC by cutting their oil 
consumption (energy intensity). They did this by reducing or replacing their 
consumption of oil as a primary energy source: reducing it by more rational 
and efficient use of energy (insulation, more efficient engines and 
machinery, etc.), replacing it by converting to nuclear energy and natural gas 
for power generation and natural gas for heating. Some developing 
countries such as Brazil used cane sugar alcohol as an alternative to petrol.  
 
The reverse oil crisis of the 1990s led to some rational use of energy (RUE) 
solutions being economically sidelined. From an RUE perspective, prices of 
$65-$100 per barrel in 2006-2007 are arguably more of an advantage than a 
disadvantage. Indeed, assuming an estimated worldwide energy 
consumption of 11429 Mtoe per year24 or 400 EJ per year in 2005 
[26][27][28], oil was still the most used primary energy source at 37.3%. 
Over 50 % of this oil is used by the transport sector, where derivatives (i.e. 
diesel, kerosene, petrol) predominate. With the world now used to travelling 
as and when it pleases, it is here that the stranglehold of petroleum is most 
keenly felt. However, the use of other primary non-renewable energy 
sources such as coal, natural gas and nuclear energy is also problematic.  
 
Coal will be available in large quantities and evenly distributed reserves for 
at least another 250 years. This is notably the case in the United States, 
Russia, India and China. China and India depended on coal for over 75% of 
their power production and the US for almost 50% (which immediately 
explains why these three countries did not sign the Kyoto Protocol). 
However, using coal or lignite to generate electricity still involves either a 
                                                   
24 Mtoe = Mega (106 or million) tonne oil equivalent = 0.0209 million barrels per day = 42 PJ (PJ = Peta 
Joule = 1015 Joule). 
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high environmental cost or major investment. As regards the environmental 
cost, 41.6 billion tonne of CO2 equivalent or GtCO2e25 was produced 
worldwide in the year 2000 [29]. Of this, 24.7 GtCO2e in 2000 (and 26.6 
GtCO2e in 2005) came from burning fossil fuels [30]. More specifically, 
10.3 GtCO2e came from power generation, of which 6.6 GtCO2e was from 
coal-fired generation [31][32]. Within the 42 GtCO2e of annual emissions, 
coal-fired electricity generation therefore accounts for almost 16% of all 
Greenhouse-Gas (GHG) emissions worldwide. Moreover, the total investment 
cost (TIC) of a modern coal-fired power station, though admittedly 
dependent on the technology used (€1600 to €2100/kW) and the presence 
or absence of CO2 capture (€2800/kW for a 500-MW power station), may 
exceed that of a nuclear power station (€2100/kW for a 1600 MWe PWR 
type reactor e.g. Areva EPR) [33][34][35].  
 
With natural gas the issue of transmission is key, since natural gas, like oil, is 
not found in the regions where it is consumed. The transmission of natural 
gas in liquid form (i.e. Liquefied Natural Gas LNG) is no easy matter. 
Crossing oceans requires an expensive logistical chain, from liquefaction 
through methane tankers to regasification26. The advantage of natural gas 
over oil is that it is more plentiful and better distributed geographically, 
although large reserves are often found with oil (e.g. the extensive gas 
reserves in Russia, Iran, Qatar, Bahrain and Yemen) and therefore 
guaranteeing continuity of supply may be an issue as well. 
 
Finally, nuclear energy probably offers the most potential of all. Proven 
(economic) uranium and thorium reserves could sustain current production 
levels for at least another 50 years and possibly up to several centuries if we 
include the nuclear fuel generated by breeder reactors [36][37][38]. On the 
minus side are the associated safety risks and the problem of processing 
                                                   
25 GtCO2e = Giga (109 or billion) tonne CO2 equivalent. In 2000, the 41.6 GtCO2e consisted of: 77% 
carbon dioxide (CO2), 14% methane (CH4), 8% nitrogen monoxide or laughing gas (N2O) and 1% F gases 
(e.g. sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)).  
CO2 is used as the standard for determining the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of other greenhouse 
gases. CO2 has a GWP index of 1 over a period of 100 years. The CO2e or carbon dioxide equivalent is 
the weight (usually expressed in million metric tonnes) of a greenhouse gas multiplied by its GWP index. 
CO2e is therefore the amount of CO2 that would cause the same GWP over a period of 100 years as the 
amount of greenhouse gas. For example, the emission of 1 million tonnes (Mt) of methane (GPW = 21) or 
nitrogen monoxide (GWP = 310) is ‘equivalent’ to the emission of 21 MtCO2 and 310 MtCO2 
respectively, in terms of its warming effect.  
26 The cost of an LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) chain from exploration & production, liquefaction, 
transmission and regasification is around $7-9 billion for a capacity of 5 million tonnes of LNG/year. For 
reference: 1 million tonnes of LNG is enough to supply a modern 1000-MW gas-fired power station 
(CCGT) for one year. 
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highly radioactive waste. Industrialised countries are worried about 
accidents, while with developing countries there is a fear of potential 
military use of nuclear energy (in Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, India, etc.). 
This has been apparent since 2006 in the ongoing ambiguities surrounding 
the Iranian nuclear programme - one of the causes, incidentally, of the 
current oil crisis.  
 
With hydroelectric power, development potential is rather limited and the 
Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze river in China seems likely to be the last 
large-scale hydroelectric scheme for some time. Moreover, possible global 
warming may affect water reserves stored in the snow and glaciers of the 
Andes and Himalayas. These water reserves feed the reservoirs of 
hydroelectric power stations, which are used extensively in Latin America 
(Brazil, for instance, generates over 75% of its electricity at hydropower 
plants), China and northern India. 
 
In theory, the other conventional non-renewable energy sources (i.e. coal, 
gas and uranium) should suffice to meet humanity’s needs in the 21st 
century and to offset the problem of depleting oil stocks27. However, two 
issues require special attention: the American consumption model and 
energy consumption in China and India.  
 
In 2004, oil consumption in the United States (US) was 20.5 million barrels 
per day, almost a quarter of total world production. Of this, 65.0% (13.24 
million barrels per day) was used for transport [39]. The situation is 
comparable, if less pronounced, in most OECD countries. Furthermore, oil 
in the US is barely taxed and is therefore much cheaper than in Europe. 
Even with oil at $95 per barrel (last quarter 2007), US consumers pay on 
average just $ 0.82 or €0.58 a litre (i.e. $3.1 a gallon28) compared with €1.3-
1.8 elsewhere in the world. As a result, American consumers are subject to 
few consumption reduction measures during one of the three major 
consumption periods: the spring driving season29. As a result, US energy 
demand has continued to rise steadily: by 2.0% in 2003, 2.5% in 2004 and 
1.8% in 2005 [40]. Over the past three years, worldwide oil demand has 
                                                   
27 cf. supra: lifetime of 274 years for coal, 160 years for natural gas and over 300 years for nuclear fuel, 
including fuel from breeder reactors. 
28 1 gallon = 3.79 litres. Average US retail price on 27th December 2007:  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_home_page.html [last accessed 
3rd January 2008]. 
29 The other two periods are the heating season in winter, which sees heavy demand for coal and gas, and 
the cooling season in summer, when air-conditioning is switched on across the country and the demand 
for electricity, and hence coal and natural gas, rockets. 
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increased by 6 million barrels per day. Of this, 4 million barrels per day were 
for developing countries (including 2 million barrels/day for China) and 2 
million barrels/day were for the OECD countries (including 1 million 
barrels/day for the US). The American model, which is now firmly 
entrenched (cf. President Bush’s30 arguments, as presented in 2001, for not 
signing the Kyoto Protocol), is a major environmental liability for the 
planet. Even so, the US has since 2001 modified their position by 
acknowledging at the December 2007 United Nations conference on 
climate change in Bali the existence of a climate change problem, no 
commitments have been taken or accepted yet: neither on CO2 reduction 
objectives nor on a timetable to reach any reduction target. Stanislaw [41] 
formulates the US environmental liability as the 2-5-25-25 challenge. The US 
has only 2% of the world’s reserves and 5% of the world’s population, yet 
consumes 25% of core non-renewable fossil primary energy sources (i.e. oil, 
gas and coal) and accounts for 25% of annual global CO2 emissions. This is 
of course owing to its high GDP, yet the gulf between the US and the rest 
of the world clearly points to a global imbalance. According to the World 
Bank, 2.7 billion people around the world live on under $2 a day31. These 
people have no access to electricity, water and sanitary or other essential 
services, but are increasingly aware of Western lifestyles and the economic 
imbalance between developed and developing countries.  
 
In 1975, China was not even listed as an oil-consuming nation, yet by 2005, 
it had become the second biggest oil consumer in the world. China’s oil 
needs, like those of India, are set to increase further between 2005 and 
2015. According to United Nations projections32, China’s population will 
rise by 77 million and India’s by 157 million between 2005 and 2015. By 
2015, the IEA [42] estimates that their energy consumption will have 
doubled to trebled and that both countries will need to import 70-80% of 
their required energy. Unless specific steps are taken, consumption patterns 
in the US, China and India will create continued demand for oil in the next 
20 years. Worldwide oil consumption is thus forecast to reach 120 million 
barrels per day between 2020 and 2030 [42].  
 
 
                                                   
30 Bush, G.W., 13th March 2001, Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html [last accessed 2nd January 2008]. 
31 World Bank PovertyNet – http://www.worldbank.org/poverty [last accessed 28th December 2007]. 
32 World Population Prospect, 2004 revision, United Nations. 
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7. Possible evolutions of the petroleum market: a scenario 
approach 
The complexity of demand and supply on the petroleum market makes it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible (figure 4), to reliably predict the future 
evolution of this market using econometric forecasting techniques or 
(market) modelling. The number of exogenous and endogenous variables is 
too great and their reactions and movements too uncertain to calculate a 
sufficiently reliable forecast (i.e. with a small standard deviation) of the 
future evolution of key figures in the petroleum market, based on historical 
data, using econometric extrapolation techniques [43]. 
 
Figure 4:   Spot Price vs. Forward Prices of Brent Crude Oil (1997 – 2006) 
 
 
 
To support this argument, we examined the average monthly spot price for 
a barrel of Brent crude oil33 together with the associated month-end forward 
price curve, on the ICE Futures exchange (formerly the International 
                                                   
33 The spot and forward prices are nominal prices in US dollar per barrel of Brent crude oil on the ICE 
Futures (formerly the International Petroleum Exchange IPE) in London. 
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Petroleum Exchange IPE) in London over the period 1997-2006 (figure 4). 
According to financial theory, these forward price curves are the best and 
most comprehensive information available on the market at any time. As 
figure 4 shows, virtually all of the forward price curves fail to predict actual 
oil prices (price level or trend) with any degree of accuracy. In fact, we can 
go further and say that systematic errors occur as a result of trusting what 
we term anchor prices, i.e. forward price levels that converge at a relatively 
stable, anticipated, future market price around which market prices are, as it 
were, anchored. Indeed, it can sometimes be several years before the market 
is ready to revise its forecasts or expectations regarding anticipated price 
level (e.g. $20 price level per barrel - figure 4).  
 
An alternative method to econometric forecasting, one that can be used in 
complex situations where the past displays insufficient continuity to predict 
the future using extrapolation, is strategic scenario planning34 [44]. Econometric 
forecasting techniques are implicitly based on factors that are assumed to 
display continuity with the future. Indeed, this is a pre-condition for 
applying extrapolation with any degree of accuracy. The disadvantage of 
these techniques, therefore, is their assumption that the future displays a 
significant degree of continuity with the past and is thus more predictable 
than is actually the case.  
 
In contrast to econometric forecasting techniques, scenario planning does 
not aim to forecast the ‘correct’ or ‘probable’ future but rather aims, based 
on a thorough analysis, to arrive at a better and systematic understanding of 
the main factors that may shape the future. Because scenario planning is 
based on uncertainties formulated around strategic questions, it enables the 
future - or possible futures - to be examined in a more flexible way. 
Opportunities and risks can therefore be identified early on and 
discontinuous changes reacted to more quickly because the relationship 
between different developments is understood more immediately, based on 
a coherent and considered vision of the future. For a methodological 
discussion of scenario planning techniques, see the article by Bradfield, 
Wright, Burt, Cairns [45] and by Van Der Heijden [46]. 
 
In 2005 and 2006, in partnership with Cambridge Energy Research Associates 
[47] and the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization (University of 
                                                   
34 Another common technique for long-tem forecasting is the Delphi method developed by the Rand 
Corporation. An extensive literature can be found on the Rand Corporation website: http://www.rand.org 
[last accessed 4th January 2008]. 
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Oxford), three in-depth scenarios were developed concerning possible 
evolutions of the petroleum market. Sixty-eight companies worldwide took 
part in this research and interviews were held with 22 experts. In accordance 
with standard practice in scenario development, three strategic uncertainties 
were selected following in-depth preparatory research. These strategic 
uncertainties are important as they could fundamentally affect future market 
developments in the next two decades. The three strategic uncertainties, 
formulated in terms of strategic questions and possible answers to them, 
resulted in three different future market evolutions or scenarios, which we 
will abbreviate as (1) Asian Phoenix, (2) Break Point and (3) Global Fissures.  
 
For each of the scenarios, we discuss the strategic uncertainties and strategic 
questions in turn and briefly describe the corresponding market scenario. 
Note that all prices given below are nominal. The principal key figures for 
each of the three scenarios are summarised in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2:    Summary of key figures for each scenario 
 
 
Key figures Asian 
Phoenix  
Break  
Point  
Global  
Fissures 
Economic Growth     
Growth in GDP/PPP (%)    
World 4.0 3.9 2.9 
OECD Asia 2.4 1.8 1.5 
China 6.9 5.9 5.0 
Europe 1.5 2.2 0.9 
US 2.9 3.0 1.9 
    
 
Primary Energy    
Growth in demand for primary energy (%) 2.3 1.9 1.6 
Percentage change in global share    
Oil (6.0) (8.0) (4.0) 
Gas 2.0 2.0 3.0 
Coal 3.0 3.0 2.0 
Nuclear (1.0) 0.0 (2.0) 
Renewable energy 2.0 3.0 1.0 
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Key figures Asian 
Phoenix  
Break  
Point  
Global  
Fissures 
 
Oil Markets    
Real oil price per barrel (max/min for WTI) $68 / $42 $96 / $40 $62 / $16 
Nominal oil price per barrel (max/min for 
WTI) 
$81 / $49 $120 / $73 $64 / $19 
Global growth in demand for oil (%) 1.6 1.0 1.1 
    
Global demand for oil (million barrels/day)    
2010 92 88 90 
2020 108 95 100 
2030 124 108 110 
Global production (million barrels/day)    
2010 97 88 96 
2020 111 101 104 
2030 127 114 115 
Share of non-conventional oil (%) 11 15 9 
    
 
CO2 Emission 
   
Growth in CO2 emission (%) 2.3 1.7 1.6 
CO2 emission through energy in 2030 
(GtCO2e) 
41.0 35.8 35.0 
 
Source: CERA 2006, James Martin Institute, University of Oxford 
 
7.1. Scenario 1: Asian Phoenix 
This scenario takes as its strategic uncertainty growth in Asia and assumes 
that Asia will succeed in sustaining its economic growth in the coming years. 
This raises two specific strategic questions: 
 
• How would continuous economic development in Asia affect the global 
balance of power and the world order?  
• How will the resulting geopolitical changes affect the energy markets and 
competition for access to primary energy sources? 
The answers to these questions form a future scenario in which the 
economic centre of gravity shifts to Asia. In such a scenario, both Europe 
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and the US could lose their economic dominance. This scenario leads to a 
global demand of 124 million barrels per day in 2030, an increase of 40 
million barrels per day compared with 2005. The average nominal price of 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) is $64 per barrel of crude over the period 
2006-2030. The top price of $81 per barrel occurs in 2030 and the bottom 
price of $42 sometime around 2013. From 2013, prices are systematically 
driven up by instability in the Middle East, continuous strong demand in 
Asia and only a gradual increase in production capacity. However, the price 
will not exceed $100 per barrel because in this scenario a major increase in 
non-conventional fuel production is anticipated and a significant increase in 
efficiency due to high oil prices. As a result, the energy intensity of the 
global economy will decline and eventually oil prices will level off, albeit at a 
high level. 
 
7.2. Scenario 2: Break Point  
This scenario is based on the strategic uncertainty surrounding the price of 
oil and assumes that oil prices can be sustained at a high level. This results 
in the following specific strategic questions: 
 
• What conditions would serve to keep oil prices high over a long period?  
• What would be the long-term impact of such high-energy prices?  
• In the event of sustained high-energy prices, could technology and 
changed demand eventually lead to a drop in prices, thereby possibly 
dislodging oil from its primary position?  
The answers to these questions lead to a future scenario in which sustained 
high oil prices stimulate the development of substitute products. Oil loses 
its monopoly as a transport fuel, which eventually brings prices down. In 
this scenario, the oil markets are strained between 2007 and 2015. The 
average nominal price for conventional crude oil (WTI) climbs to $120 per 
barrel in 2016, then falls gradually to $80 per barrel in 2030. This steep price 
rise through to 2016 is owing to production limitations, which keep spare 
capacity low. Post 2016, the price falls steadily as a result of two factors: on 
the one hand, falling demand due to increased efficiency among end users; 
on the other hand, a relative rise in supply compared with demand due to an 
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increase in the production capacity of both conventional and non-
conventional oil. Both trends are driven by the historically high oil prices. 
 
7.3. Scenario 3: Global Fissures 
This scenario is based on the strategic uncertainty surrounding continued 
economic globalisation and assumes that such globalisation could end. This 
results in the following specific strategic questions: 
 
• It is generally assumed that globalisation of the economy (i.e. the free 
exchange of goods, services and people between countries) is an 
unstoppable force that will continue to expand. Nevertheless, is it 
conceivable that global economic integration will come to an end?  
• Are there political limits to globalisation?  
• How would a sustained global recession and an ensuing increase in trade 
protectionism affect the global energy markets?  
The answers to these questions spawn a future scenario in which extensive 
anti-globalisation and anti-trade policy combined with political tensions and 
security issues determine the future. This eventually leads to weak economic 
growth and ultimately to low energy prices. In this scenario, the oil price 
falls in around 2011 to $19 per barrel of crude oil. This price drop is the 
consequence of weak economic growth and the increase in capacity-
expanding investment, which will become operational just before prices fall, 
thereby keeping prices low. The oil price does not remain at this low level; it 
climbs back to $40 per barrel due to several years of mounting demand 
sometime around 2017. Conventional oil remains important because 
investment in non-conventional oil35 will have declined due to the low 
prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
35 Non-conventional oils comprise: extra heavy oil, tar sand oil, shale oil, biofuels and Fischer-Tropsch 
Liquids (FTLs). FTLs include the Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) and Coal-to-Liquids (CTL). 
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8. A longer-term vision: attempted synthesis 
Based on the market analysis outlined above and insights gained from the 
various strategic scenarios, we can draw a number of conclusions that will 
enable us to assess future evolutions on the petroleum market based on a 
broader vision. We structure this vision around nine statements. 
 
1. Political attention will remain heavily focused on energy issues in the coming 
years. We believe that discussions about energy (e.g. alternative 
energy sources, energy efficiency, economic implications, security 
of supply, environmental protection), will remain high on the 
political agenda of oil-consuming countries (especially the big 
ones) for many years to come. This will probably remain the case 
even if oil prices fall. For although discussions on oil demand and 
supply heat up when oil prices are high, the reasons underlying oil 
pricing go far beyond a lack of spare capacity: they are also 
affected by the political vision of both consuming and oil-
producing countries. Heavy political focus will probably lead to a 
more complex environment, as a result of political measures such 
as subsidies, taxes and trade agreements. This will also further 
complicate the geopolitical situation. Indeed, political decision-
making in countries that import a lot of energy will differ from 
that or countries that export energy. Importing countries will 
focus on guarantees of supply continuity and efficiency-enhancing 
measures, while oil-exporting countries will be geared mainly 
towards ensuring continuity of demand [48]. 
 
2. Asia, in particular China and India, will drive the growth of the global 
economy. In all scenarios, Asia is behind the growth in oil demand. 
This trend will affect all economic players. Asian demand is 
creating the need for more oil and electricity and stimulating 
demand for infrastructure to bring this supply to its markets. Asia 
is also becoming a key player in consumption of and demand for 
both oil and gas. As a result, we believe that Asian companies will 
also become more involved in joint ventures, takeovers and 
mergers. Increasing energy consumption in Asia is a sign of 
increasing economic power, something which will also be 
reflected politically at a global level. 
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3. Increase in energy efficiency. The combination of technology, 
government policy and market demand will spearhead a drive 
towards greater energy efficiency. As a result, we believe that the 
energy intensity of the OECD countries, China and India will 
continue to decline. For a detailed study of possible energy 
productivity improvements by industrial sector, see e.g. the 
McKinsey Global Institute report [49]. 
 
4. Increase in use of biofuels. The increase in ethanol and biodiesel will 
probably result in a greater correlation between agricultural prices 
(of maize and sugar cane) and the price of related fuels. This will 
also have a bearing on the price of agricultural land. 
 
5. End users must have a clear strategy for dealing with these changing market 
conditions. We think that the global fuel mix will become more 
complex, an example being the non-traditional fuels, which will 
gain in importance. The ability to adapt quickly to changing 
market conditions could mean significant advantages, assuming 
that the cost of flexibility is not too high. After all, one way that 
exporting countries are seeking to achieve demand stability is by 
offering long-term contracts, with little possibilities for arbitrage 
in the short term. 
 
6. Fischer-Tropsch Liquids36 (FTLs) will become an important alternative 
component. We anticipate an increase in the use of gas and coal (via 
the Fischer-Tropsch process) to manufacture liquid fuels. The use 
of FTLs varies widely from scenario to scenario but will increase 
significantly due either to political measures or market demand. 
This increasing interrelation between gas, coal and oil will 
probably not affect day-to-day price formation but will have an 
impact on longer-term investment choices. 
 
7. Increase in conversion technology and infrastructure. In all scenarios, the 
share of non-conventional oil expands16. This will mean additional 
importance for the various conversion technologies, which have 
hitherto been of minor significance to the energy markets. This 
will create the need for additional infrastructure, in particular 
                                                   
36 The Fischer-Tropsch process is a catalyst reaction (using iron and cobalt) in which carbon monoxide 
CO and hydrogen H2 are converted into liquid hydrocarbons CnH2n+2. One purpose of the process is to 
produce synthetic petroleum substitutes. 
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railway lines and road, in order to transport the raw materials 
(cereal crops and cane sugar) needed to produce ethanol. For the 
Coal-to-Liquids (CTL), a subset of Fischer-Tropsch Liquids, rail 
and pipelines will tend to be used. 
 
8. The speed at which energy markets can change will be limited. The size of 
the existing energy markets is such that it will take time to develop 
alternatives to traditional fossil fuels. Within a timeframe of 10 to 
20 years, increased technological innovation could well have a 
significant impact on the availability of non-traditional fuels. 
 
9. Hydrogen will not emerge as a significant alternative energy carrier. 
Hydrogen (H2) has some major challenges to overcome before it 
can make a significant contribution as an energy carrier. H2 is not 
a primary energy source itself but, like electricity, is generated 
from primary energy sources. Although niche markets for H2 
could develop, such as fuel for transport or energy generation, we 
do not believe that hydrogen will have a significant influence on 
the demand for fossil fuels before 2030. One of the reasons for 
this is the low density per volume unit of H2, which means that 
either high compression or liquefaction is necessary for economic 
use and distribution. This presents a major challenge in terms of 
the storage, distribution and trading of hydrogen. A further 
challenge is the development of production technology. Although 
a mini-hydrogen economy does already exist, this is mainly limited 
to the petrochemical sector which produces H2 from fossil fuels, 
principally gas. Building a hydrogen economy based on fossil fuel 
is not an obvious long-term solution to the energy problem. For a 
technological overview and discussion of the technological 
challenges involved in developing a hydrogen economy, see the 
BACAS37 [50] report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
37 Report available at http://www.kvab.be/downloads/CAWET/Hydrogen_energycarrier.pdf [last accessed 
31st December 2007]. 
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9. Conclusion 
We are probably on the verge of fundamental changes in the way our 
prosperity and well-being are created and their association with 
conventional oil. The difficult and complex interaction and interdependence 
between energy markets, technology, politics and environment, and their impact on 
prosperity and well-being are likely to be one of the biggest geopolitical 
issues and challenges of coming decades. 
 
Thirty-four years ago, on 18 October 1973, the OAPEC38 decided, due to a 
crisis in the Middle East (Yom Kippur war), to raise the price per barrel of 
crude oil by 70%. In the space of a few days, the price per barrel of crude 
rose from around $3 to $5, to reach $11 per barrel three months later in 
early 1974. This prompted responses such as car-free Sundays, the 
introduction of daylight savings time, speed restrictions and also a gradual 
switch to nuclear energy and natural gas and the launch of R&D projects to 
develop alternative (sustainable) energy sources (e.g. solar energy, wind 
energy) and energy saving through rational and efficient use of energy. The 
aim of all these actions was to increase energy productivity39 or to reduce energy 
intensity, and more specifically diminish dependence on oil as a source of 
energy, as quickly as possible. Three decades on and we are facing another 
energy crisis; it too has doubled prices and it too originated with a crisis in 
the Middle East. However, the background to the current crisis is more 
volatile, unpredictable and complex than in 1973. 
 
In 1973, neither China nor India were major oil consumers, whereas today 
they are poised to become the biggest consumers of the next few decades. 
Russia in 2007 is one of the biggest oil and gas producers in the world and is 
in the process of renationalising its energy sources in order to enhance its 
geopolitical role. Perhaps the most important development of all is the 
unnoticed shift in energy geography. The axis comprising Saudi Arabia, the 
Caspian Sea, Siberia and Canada is set to become the centre of gravity of 
21st century oil production, and it is partially on this axis that most 
‘democratisation projects’ are to be found. Moreover, as we move into the 
future we will have to reckon not only with an oil challenge but with a gas 
                                                   
38 OAPEC: Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. Controls over 50% of world oil 
reserves. Forms the core of OPEC. 
39 We define energy productivity of GDP as the reverse of energy intensity. Energy productivity (also 
known as ‘energy efficiency’) measures the amount of goods and services that can be produced with a 
given energy input (production per unit of energy). Energy intensity, on the other hand, measures the 
necessary energy per unit of GDP. 
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challenge too. Finally, we should not forget the issue of CO2 emissions and 
associated effect on global warming. The latter will spark an in-depth 
discussion of future energy policy and the timeframe within which solutions 
will need to be found, taking into account the fact that: at the start of the 
21st century we do not have effective global or supranational decision-
making structures for solving global problems; it is hard to assess how soon 
researchers will be able to develop innovative alternatives; and it is highly 
likely that worldwide energy demand could rise by 2 % annually over the 
next 15 years.  
 
However, the current energy crisis could be a catalyst for a new period of 
market-driven innovation in: alternative energy, energy conservation, 
sustainable energy development and international cooperation. This means 
that in the coming decades energy productivity will become a key issue for 
consumers, companies and governments alike. Indeed, rational use of 
energy is so important that it could reduce the growth in worldwide energy 
demand from 2.2% to 0.6% over the next 15 years [51]. 
 
We have wasted over 30 years by failing to invest intensively enough in 
energy productivity. We probably need more than two generations of highly 
talented individuals to find a solution for a) the transition from a global 
economy based on gas, coal and oil to one based on sustainable and 
alternative energy sources and b) an economy that uses energy in a 
fundamentally more efficient way. This in turn immediately raises the issue 
of (technical) skills management. 
 
The major challenge remains how to effect the transition from today’s 
economy to the more sustainably and efficiently driven economy of the 
future. It will mean reducing our dependence on fossil fuels and making 
fundamental transformations geared toward the use of new energy sources, 
and doing so at a global level. This transformation may occur in bursts or it 
may occur gradually. Depending on this, we will face different possible 
future scenarios and different economic prospects. 
 
However, there is also an increasing realisation that what we are dealing 
with here is a special category of problems, known as wicked problems [52]. 
Such problems have no short-term solutions due to insufficient data. 
Solutions can only be found in the longer term by means of joint 
consultation with specialists in each of the four areas mentioned and by 
focusing on technological innovation. A characteristic of such problems is that 
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they cannot be solved by conventional policy methods like efficiency 
management, setting targets or other rational decision-making, partly 
because too much information is lacking. The realisation that energy in the 
context of a macro approach is an intractable problem may help to eliminate 
naive solutions and create a more realistic pattern of expectation regarding 
possible solutions. We believe that establishing a supranational coordination 
structure is one of the necessary conditions for reaching a solution.  
 
Decision-making in such complex situations requires insights that strategic 
scenario planning could possibly help to create. Using this technique enables 
choices and expectations to be mapped more effectively. As a result, we 
could - through the decisions that we take, or do not take, today - 
potentially ensure that, of all the possible futures ahead of us, those that we 
do not choose are not simply allowed to happen. 
 
We believe it is critical that (global) enterprises whose profitability is heavily 
dependent on the evolution of oil prices (e.g. energy sector, power 
producers, transport sector, chemical industry) develop the ability to 
undertake strategic discussions in which, based on strategic scenarios, the 
robustness of strategic decisions (e.g. takeovers, capacity investments) are 
assessed based on their risk profile and performance in each of the 
scenarios. Key to this new way of strategic thinking is the need to take into 
account several different visions of the future, thereby enhancing the 
company’s strategic flexibility: an asset that will set the company apart and 
thus constitute a competitive advantage [53].  
 
It is not possible to predict the future but it is possible to have a vision of a 
desired future which could, by adopting a proactive approach, potentially 
become reality. As Baltasar Gracián (1601-1658) put it: “It is a great piece of 
skill to know how to guide your luck even while waiting for it.”  
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